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RALPH L. WADSWORTH
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:
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vs.

SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political
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DIRECTOR, THE SALT LAKE COUNTY
FLOOD CONTROL DIVISION,
:

Case No. 900234-CA
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Defendants/Appellants.
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Plaintiff

and

Appellee,

Ralph

L. Wadsworth

Construction

Company, Inc. ("Wadsworth"), pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, respectfully petitions the Court for a
rehearing.

Counsel for Wadsworth certifies that this petition is

presented in good faith and not for delay.

This Petition for

Rehearing is made on the ground that the Court overlooked or
misapprehended dispositive points of law and fact.

Those issues

are:
1.
651

Whether the decision of Rapp v. Salt Lake City. 527 P.2d

(Utah 1974),

upon which the Court based

its opinion is

distinguishable and, therefore, inapplicable to the legal and
factual arguments presented on this appeal.
2.

Whether the contract was authorized by ordinance and

whether the approval and resolution of the Salt Lake County
Commission for bidding the project under bid requirements and
1

ordinances requiring award of the contract to the low responsible
bidder was approval by the Commission for the contract,
3.

Whether

the

obligations

and

covenants

required

of

Wadsworth by Salt Lake County in its bid requirements were binding
upon Wadsworth, and if so, whether these obligations were supported
by consideration thereby creating mutual obligations on the part
of Salt Lake County to also perform and award the project to
Wadsworth.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RAPP v. SALT LAKE CITY DECISION IS DISTINGUISHABLE
FROM THE PRESENT CASE IN THAT IT DID NOT INVOLVE THE
LEGAL AND FACTUAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON THIS APPEAL AND,
THEREFORE, IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE,
The Court's decision that no contractual relationship existed
between Salt Lake County and Wadsworth and that the County was not
required to award to Wadsworth is based upon Rapp v. Salt Lake
City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974).
Wadsworth's

argument

that

the

The decision does not address
Rapp

decision

is

clearly

distinguishable from the present case in that different legal
issues were presented.

The Court in Rapp did not address the

specific ordinance in this case requiring award to the lowest
responsible

bidder, but

rather was

based

only

upon

a more

generalized ordinance requiring approval of contracts by the city

2

council.

Rapp dealt only with the general common law duty of a

municipality not to act with bad faith, fraud or collusion with
respect to awarding contracts and with principles of implied
contract.

The issues in this case involve express obligations

imposed by County ordinance and an express promise in the bid
documents to award the project to the low responsible bidder.
The Rapp case was based upon the reasoning that an ordinary
invitation for bids is not an offer to be accepted by the bidder
but only a request for offers from the bidder.

In the present

case, the Invitation for Bids was much more than an ordinary
invitation or advertisement for bids.

The County let the project

for bid under Salt Lake County Ordinance, § 18-1-1, and written bid
provisions expressly providing that the project would be awarded
to the low bidder according to the contract documents upon which
the bids were based.

When Wadsworth submitted its bid, it agreed

in return to undertake significant obligations to the County. The
County required Wadsworth to covenant to hold its bid open for 60
days, to provide a bid bond on which Wadsworth was liable to the
County,

and

further

to

enter

into

the

final

contract

upon

satisfaction of the condition that it was the lowest responsible
bidder.

(R. 247, 248, 263).

Additionally, the County's bid

documents provided for liquidated and other contractual measures
of damages in the event Wadsworth failed to enter into and perform
Such a
requirement in
requirement that
Flovd v. Western
1989) .

general ordinance cannot override the specific
Section 18-1-1 which contains the mandatory
the project shall be awarded to the low bidder.
Surgical AssociatesP 773 P.2d 401, 404 (Utah App.
3

the contract if it was the low bidder.

(R. 263, 247, 248). The

circumstances presented in this case go well beyond the ordinary
and plain request for bids addressed in Rapp.
Furthermore, the Rapp case did not address the fundamental
principles of contract law which, when applied to the particular
facts of this case clearly establish a mutuality of obligation on
the part of the parties and the existence of an express preliminary
contract between Wadsworth and Salt Lake County for the award of
the construction project to the lowest responsible bidder.

When

Salt Lake County requested bids, it promised to award the contract
to the lowest responsible bidder.

Swinerton & Walberg Company v.

City of Inglewood, etc., 114 Cal.Rptr. 834, 838 (1974); Owen of
Georgia, Inc. v. Shelby County, 648 F. 2d 1084, 1095 (6th Circuit
1981).

Where a promise, such as the County's promise to award to

the low responsible bidder, is supported by another promise or
other consideration, the promise is enforceable and a binding
contract is formed.
P.2d 1028, 1036

Resource Management Co. v Western Ranch, 706

(Utah 1985).

None of the foregoing factual and legal points were addressed
by Rapp and require attention by this Court in deciding the issues
presented on this appeal.

4

POINT II
THE CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNTY AND
WADSWORTH ARE AUTHORIZED BY ORDINANCE AND APPROVED BY THE
COUNTY COMMISSION.
The Court's opinion, at page three, states that the "[n]o
contract is binding on the County...until it has been approved by
the Board or authorized by ordinance or resolution."

The opinion

further states that Wadsworth presented no argument that the
contract was authorized by ordinance or resolution.

To the

contrary, the primary thrust of Wadsworth*s brief is that Salt Lake
County Ordinance, § 18-1-1, expressly authorized and required the
contract in question, and that the County Commission approved the
contract when it approved the bidding of the project under the
ordinance and provisions for contracting with the low bidder
authorized the contract.

(Wadsworth Brief pp. 11-16).

Salt Lake County was required, under its own ordinance to
award the subject construction project and contract with Wadsworth
as the low, responsible bidder.

Revised Statutes of Salt Lake

County, § 18-1-1, provides that the contract "...shall be let by
competitive bidding after advertisement, to the lowest responsible
bidder..."

The bid documents prepared by the County further

provide that "the award of contract, if made, would be to the
lowest,

responsive,

ordinance."

responsible

(R. 2 62).

bidder,

pursuant

to

county

Salt Lake County had a mandatory duty to

award the construction contract to the low responsible bidder.
Fowler v. Citv of Anchorage, 583 P.2d 817, 820 (Alaska 1978)(City
has a statutory duty to do what an ordinance says "shall" be done) ;
5

Carpet City, Inc. v. Stillwater Municipal Hospital Authority, 53 6
P.2d 335 (Oklahoma 1975); Gerard Construction Company v. City of
Manchester, 415 A.2d 1137, 1139-40 (N.H. 1980); R. E. Short Company
v. City of Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331, 343 (Minn. 1978).2
The opinion refers to Salt Lake County Ordinance, § 2.04.1003
which requires the contract be approved by the County Commission
or be authorized

by ordinance or resolution.

As argued in

Wadsworth's brief, the contract in this case was authorized and
required by County ordinance and approved by the County Commission.
When the County Commission approved bidding of the project, the
contract
writing.

documents

and

specifications

were

fully

reduced to

The contract was authorized by the ordinance requiring

contracting with the low bidder and the County Commission expressly
approved the contract when it approved bidding under the ordinance
and bid instructions requiring the contract with the low bidder.
(Wadsworth brief, p. 16) . Furthermore, the more specific ordinance

It has similarly been stated that "since government by
conduct sets an example for all of us, it, above all, must obey its
own laws.fl Swinerton & Walbera Company v. City of Inalewood. etc.,
114 Cal.Rptr. 834, 838 (1974) (citing Holmstead v United Statesy
277 U.S. 438, 485, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944, 960 (1928). Salt
Lake County was bound by its own ordinance to award the contract
to Wadsworth as the low responsible bidder on the project.
The designation of this ordinance at the relevant time in
this matter was Section 1-2-9, Salt Lake County Ordinances.
This is always the case in public competitive bidding
because it is the contract and specifications written and furnished
by the municipality upon which bids are based. In fact, the bid
requirements in this case required the bid to be based upon these
contract documents furnished by the County with approval from the
Commission.
6

§ 18-1-1 requiring the contract with the low bidder controls over
the more generalized ordinance § 2.04.100.

Floyd v. Western

Surgical Associates, 773 P.2d 401 (Utah App. 1989).
Although the commission purported to reject Wadsworth's bid,
this is not the same as disapproving the contract itself.

The

contract itself was already approved, authorized and required by
the County's own ordinance.

Section 18-1-5 of the County's

ordinances only allows rejection of a bid for a "valid reason"
which is limited to where the bidder is not "responsible". In this
case it is undisputed that Wadsworth is a responsible contractor.
Where no valid

reason for rejection of the bid exists, the

commission's purported rejection of the bid cannot be construed as
disapproval of the bidding process or contract the commission
itself approved and which was authorized and required by § 18-11.
The Court's opinion overlooks and does not address Wadsworth's
argument that the contract was authorized by ordinance and approved
by the County commission.
made no such argument.

In fact, the opinion states Wadsworth
Wadsworth, therefore, is entitled to

rehearing on this vital aspect of its case.
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POINT III
THE OBLIGATIONS AGREED TO BY WADSWORTH IN RETURN FOR THE
COUNTY'S OBLIGATION TO AWARD TO WADSWORTH AS THE LOW
BIDDER CREATED MUTUAL CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS.
The Court's opinion does not address the effect of the mutual
obligations and consideration between the parties which establish
the contract asserted by Wadsworth.

The County bid documents and

ordinance required award and contract with the low responsible
bidder.

In return Wadsworth undertook significant contractual

obligations.

Without addressing these issues, the impact of the

Court's decision that no contractual obligation exists on the part
of the County is that the obligations purportedly imposed by the
County, and other municipalities, in its bid instructions and
documents are illusory and unenforceable.
When Salt Lake County requested bids, it promised to award the
contract
Swinerton

to

the

lowest

& Walbera

responsible

Company v.

City

bidder
of

under

§

18-1-1.

Incrlewood, etc., 40

Cal.App.3d 104, 114 Cal.Rptr. 834, 838 (1974); Owen, supra.

The

County's promise to award the contract to the low responsible
bidder was supported by consideration in the form of a benefit to
the County in obtaining the lowest available price for the work,
Owen, supra, and by Wadsworth's covenants, inter alia, to hold the
bid open for sixty days, to provide a bid bond, and to be liable
for contractual liquidated damages if it failed to perform the
project if the low bidder.
Where a promise, such as the County's promise to award to the
low responsible bidder, is supported by another promise or other
8

consideration, such as the covenants made by Wadsworth, the promise
is enforceable and a binding contract

is formed.

Resource

Management Co, v Western Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985);
Sucrarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah
1980).

Wadsworth's remedy for breach of such contract is recovery

from the County of Wadsworthfs lost profits.

Alexander v. Brown,

646 P. 2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982).
The Court's opinion does not address the incongruity of the
County's argument that there is no contract despite the mutual
obligations

of

the

parties.

The

County

asserts

that

the

obligations undertaken by Wadsworth are binding upon Wadsworth.
The obligations the County seeks to impose upon Wadsworth can only
be binding, however, if there is some consideration to support
these obligations.

The consideration here, is the County's

obligation to award to the low bidder. The Court must consider the
effect and ramifications on the entire public competitive bidding
system in the State of Utah if the Court holds there is no
contractual obligation.

The result is to open the door for low

bidders on public projects to ignore the bid provisions of holding
bids

open

and

challenge

the

contractual

liquidated

damages

provisions for withdrawing its bid and refusing to perform for the
amount of the low bid.

Low bidders will be permitted to withdraw

their bids after opening and then negotiate for higher prices
between its low bid and the next low bid.
bidding system will be destroyed.

9

The integrity of the

This threat to the foundation of public competitive bidding
requires careful consideration of the purpose of such bidding. The
Court's Opinion points out that the competitive bidding is for the
benefit of the public.

Opinion, p.4.

The Opinion does not

address, however, Wadsworth's argument that the bidding process
necessarily also is intended to provide a fair forum for bidders.
Piatt Elec. Sup, Inc. v. City of Seattle Div. of Pur, 16 Wash. App.
265, 555 P.2d 421, 426 (1976).

The protection of the public and

integrity of the bidding process requires meaningful enforcement
of enforcing the ordinances governing the competitive bidding
process, i.e. monetary damages to wrongfully rejected bidders.
Otherwise, if contractors have little faith in the bidding process,
fewer contractors will bid, less competition will result and the
public will pay higher prices.
forum

intended

by

the

More significantly, if the fair

bidding

laws

and

ordinances

are not

adequately enforceable by those participating, then such ordinances
and laws are rendered ineffectual and the intended protection of
the public illusory.
The practical necessity of providing an adequate remedy in the
form of monetary damages was recognized in Airline Const, v.
Ascension Parish School, 549 So.2d 1240 (La.App. 1989).

In that

case the County argued that a wrongfully rejected bidder was
limited to injunctive relief only and could not recover monetary
damages.

In rejecting this argument, the Court stated:

We believe these cases recognize that it would be unfair
to establish a rule under which aggrieved bidders would
in all instances be barred from obtaining monetary
damages for violations of the Public Contracts Law. The
10

inequities of such a ruling are particularly telling in
situations wherein an aggrieved bidder files an
injunction suit prior to or immediately in response to
an alleged wrongful award of a contract, but due to the
lapse of time before a determination on the merits can
be made, the project is near completion. The bidder in
reality may no longer enjoin the project. It would be
unfair to rule that the bidder in this scenario would not
be entitled to some relief, perhaps in the form of
monetary damages.
Id. at 1246.

The need to provide an adequate monetary remedy is

particularly evident in this case where Wadsworth promptly filed
this action and sought injunctive relief and where the remedy of
injunctive relief failed due to the vigorous persistence of the
County not to preserve the status quo during the pendency of this
dispute.
The ordinances and the bidding instructions in this case have
a dual purpose to protect the bidders as well as the general
public.

Piatt Elec. , 555 P. 2d at 426.

Both purposes suffer if

Wadsworth is denied a remedy since the County would then be given
free reign to arbitrarily ignore its obligation under the ordinance
with impunity, thereby undermining the integrity and value of
competitive bidding. Where Wadsworthfs bid was wrongfully rejected
in violation of the ordinance, an appropriate remedy must be
fashioned to effectuate the purposes of public competitive bidding.
CONCLUSION
The Court's opinion overlooks several significant arguments
presented by Wadsworth in its Brief and at the oral argument of
this matter.

The Rapp decision is distinguishable from this case

and has no bearing on the factual and legal issues raised by
Wadsworth which were not addressed by Rapp.
11

The contract in this

case was approved by the County Commission and was expressly
authorized

and

required

by

County

ordinance.

The

mutual

obligations on the part of Salt Lake County and Wadsworth, which
were

not

present

relationship

in

between

the
the

Rapp

case,

parties.

create

The

a

purposes

contractual
of

public

competitive bidding in protecting the public require a meaningful
remedy be afforded wrongfully rejected bidders in order to enforce
the provisions and provide such protection.
Dated this

\ ^y^day of October, 1991.
BEESLEY, FAIRCLOUGH, CANNON & FITTS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing Memorandum were mailed, United States Mail, first class,
postage prepaid, this J^£jj^lay of October, 1991 to the following:
David E. Yocum
Jeffery H. Thorpe
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

12

